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This paper provides an analysis of Keynes’s original “Bancor” proposal as well as 
more recent proposals for fixed exchange rates. We argue that these schemes fail to 
pay due attention to the importance of capital movements in today’s economy, and 
that they implicitly adopt an unsatisfactory notion of money as a mere medium of 
exchange. We develop an alternative approach to money based on the notion of 
currency sovereignty. As currency sovereignty implies the ability of a country to 
implement monetary and fiscal policies independently, we argue that it is necessarily 
contingent on a country’s adoption of floating exchange rates. As illustrations of the 
problems created for domestic policy by the adoption of fixed exchange rates, we 
briefly look at the recent Argentinean and European experiences. We take these as 
telling examples of the high costs of giving up sovereignty (Argentina and the 
European countries of the EMU) and the benefits of regaining it (Argentina). A 
regime of more flexible exchange rates would have likely produced a more viable and 
dynamic European economic system, one in which each individual country could 
have adopted and implemented a mix of fiscal and monetary policies more suitable to 
its specific economic, social, and political context. Alternatively, the euro area will 
have to create a fiscal authority on par with that of the U.S. Treasury, which means 
surrendering national authority to a central government—an unlikely possibility in 
today’s political climate. We conclude by pointing out some of the advantages of 
floating exchange rates, but also stress that such a regime should not be regarded as a 
sort of panacea. It is a necessary condition if a country is to retain its sovereignty and 
the power to implement autonomous economic policies, but it is not a sufficient 
condition for guaranteeing that such policies actually be aimed at providing higher 
levels of employment and welfare. 
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 11. INTRODUCTION 
 
The idea that a regime of fixed exchange rates is superior to one of flexible rates is 
deeply ingrained in the Keynesian and Post Keynesian traditions of economic thought. 
This is not surprising in light of Keynes’s own position in the 1940s and his 
contribution to the creation of the Bretton Woods system. Although the creation and 
implementation of the new architecture of the post-war international monetary system 
differed from what Keynes envisioned, most of his followers do not doubt that 
Keynes’s position was characterized by the idea that a better organization of the 
international economy had to rely on a regime of fixed but adjustable exchange rates, 
which could work only if strict controls and constraints on capital movements were 
introduced, along with international institutions that could lend reserves as necessary 
to temporarily hold exchange rates as interventions adjusted policy to move toward 
balanced trade. 
  Many Keynesian and Post Keynesian economists have never abandoned the 
idea that fixed exchange rates are superior to flexible rates. They support their 
viewpoint by pointing out that the current regime of flexible rates, together with the 
free movement of capital, is far more unstable and prone to crises than was the 
previous Bretton Woods regime. A return to fixed exchange rates is therefore seen as 
the way to ensure more stability in the international economic system (Moore 2004). 
We do not question that in some respects the current regime of floating exchange rates 
is more unstable than the previous one, but we intend to argue that trying to go back 
to a regime of fixed exchange rates is neither feasible nor desirable. The global 
economic conditions that made Bretton Woods a more-or-less successful exchange 
rate regime are no longer in place and cannot be resuscitated.  
  A fixed exchange rate regime can work efficiently to eliminate trade 
imbalances only in the presence of perfect, or quasi-perfect, capital immobility. 
Currently, however, the world economy is characterized by very high capital mobility, 
as most of the Bretton Woods constraints and controls have been removed in a large 
number of countries. In addition, there is no effective mechanism that removes trade 
imbalances—so long as compensating capital flows attenuate exchange rate pressures. 
Going back to fixed rates would require, therefore, a thorough reform of the 
international economic system, which should either reintroduce the old controls or 
invent new ways to limit capital mobility. 
 2  We see two major obstacles to such a reformist project. On the one hand, there 
are difficulties arising from the current economic, political, and ideological 
environment, still dominated by a laissez faire stance. On the other hand, there are 
“technological” and economic difficulties. The evolution of international monetary 
and financial markets has reached a stage of complexity and sophistication that makes 
it very hard to imagine and implement effective capital controls (Mussa, et al. 2000). 
Moreover, it is not only true that today capital can move very rapidly and easily from 
one corner of the world to another, but also that the size of capital markets and the 
volume of daily transactions makes it very hard for single countries to effectively 
counteract and neutralize decisions made in these markets to defend their rate of 
exchange—unless they are able to accumulate huge “war chests” of international 
reserves. 
  Especially in Keynes’s own vision of the post-war world economic order, 
there was the idea that some form of international governance was necessary. 
Historically, the idea of a world government has been replaced by the hegemonic role 
of the United States. In fact, when such hegemony was partly questioned and 
challenged in the 1970s as a consequence of the U.S. economic and political 
problems, the Bretton Woods system collapsed. Today we do not see any greater 
likelihood of proceeding to the creation of some form of international governance of 
the world economy than the likelihood of doing so in the early post-war era. In the 
present context, if one wants fixed exchange rates, it is perhaps more realistic to aim 
at reinstating and reinvigorating the hegemonic role of the United States, which 
should accept more general responsibilities for being the world’s dominant power. 
The political implications of such a choice are evident, but we do not enter into that 
debate, instead limiting ourselves to ask Post Keynesians the question whether a 
greater role of the United States in the governance of the world economy is something 
that they would regard as desirable. 
  That there exist significant difficulties to reintroduce a regime of fixed 
exchange rates does not say much about the desirability of such regime. In our 
opinion, however, there are important theoretical considerations that lend support to 
the conclusion that adopting fixed exchange rates is not advantageous if it is not 
accompanied by the creation of an institution capable of providing an advanced form 
of international governance. To adopt a regime of fixed exchange rates without the 
creation of some sort of “world government” implies that single countries renounce 
 3their sovereignty, i.e., their ability to maintain fiscal and currency independence. We 
believe this only compounds the problem by creating the sort of global deflationary 
bias that Keynes feared—a sort of modern mercantilism based on accumulation of 
international reserves.  
  The paper is organized as follows. The next section is devoted to a brief 
description of Keynes’s original proposal of a regime of fixed exchange rates and 
some more recent developments by Post Keynesians. Our criticism of Keynes’s and 
Post Keynesian schemes for the adoption of fixed exchange rates is that they fail to 
pay due attention to the importance of capital movements in the determination of 
exchange rates. Instead, these reformist proposals tend to concentrate on current 
account imbalances. We argue that these schemes implicitly adopt a notion of money 
essentially seen as a mere medium of exchange. We regard this notion of money as 
unsatisfactory. 
  On the grounds of our critique of the notion of money that underpins the 
predilection for a fixed exchange rates regime, in the following section we expound 
our alternative approach to money, based on the notion of currency sovereignty. We 
hold that this approach to money is not only consistent with a Post Keynesian analysis 
of the international economy, but it also derives from Keynes himself, though from 
his Treatise on Money. As currency sovereignty implies the ability of a country to 
implement monetary and fiscal policies independently, we argue in section 4 that it is 
necessarily contingent on the country’s adoption of floating exchange rates. 
  In section 5, we briefly look at the Argentinean and European recent 
experiences. We take them as telling examples of the high costs of giving up 
sovereignty (Argentina and the European countries of the EMU) and the benefits of 
regaining it (Argentina). In both cases, extreme forms of fixed exchange rates were 
adopted to provide more stability to the economy. Argentina chose a currency board 
based on the U.S. dollar; some European countries adopted the euro as their single 
currency. 
  In the case of Argentina, when the currency board was abandoned after its 
deep economic crisis, the country regained its sovereignty and could take policy 
initiatives to promote growth and employment. In the case of Europe, the adoption of 
the euro by twelve countries gave rise to the creation of a currency area that is 
comparable in size to the United States. However, unlike in the United States, within 
the euro area there is no adequate European authority to operate fiscal policy that 
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United States. The ECB fixes a unique interest rate and influences the euro’s 
exchange rate with the other international currencies. This form of economic 
architecture is viable only to the extent that individual European countries subject 
themselves to strict fiscal constraints (the Maastricht Treaty) while they, of course, 
have lost any possibility to implement autonomous monetary policies or to control 
capital movements across borders. 
  This has produced, in our view, an intrinsically deflationary environment in 
Europe. A regime of more flexible exchange rates could have likely produced a more 
viable and dynamic European economic system, in which each individual country 
could have adopted and implemented a mix of fiscal and monetary policies more 
suitable to its specific economic, social, and political context. Alternatively, the euro 
area will have to create a fiscal authority on par with that of the U.S. Treasury—
which means surrendering national authority to a central government, an unlikely 
possibility in today’s political climate. 
  Section 5 concludes by pointing out some of the advantages of having floating 
exchange rates, but also by stressing that such a regime should not be regarded as a 
sort of panacea. It is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for a country to retain 
its sovereignty and the power to implement autonomous economic policies, but it is 
not a sufficient condition to guarantee that such policies be actually aimed at 
providing higher levels of employment and welfare. 
 
2.  KEYNES’S BANCOR PLAN AND THE END OF BRETTON WOODS 
 
Keynes called for the creation of an International Clearing Union (ICU) based on a 
Bancor unit of account; the Bancor, in turn, would be fixed in value relative to gold 
and then the currencies of all countries participating in the ICU would be fixed 
relative to the Bancor. The Bancor would be used only for clearing purposes among 
countries; countries could buy Bancor balances from the ICU using gold, but Bancors 
could not be redeemed for gold—ensuring there could be no run on Bancors. 
  At the outset, the quantity of Bancor reserves would be distributed among 
countries based on their previous levels of international trade. Countries running trade 
surpluses would accumulate additional reserves, while deficit countries would 
 5surrender reserves. The ICU would provide overdraft facilities to those countries that 
exhausted their reserves. Since reserves could not leave the system, the ICU could 
always expand the supply of Bancor reserves merely by making advances to deficit 
countries. In addition, surplus countries could use Bancor reserves to make loans to, 
investments in, or unilateral grants to deficit countries. The ICU would adopt rules 
regarding actions to be taken against debtors and against countries running persistent 
surpluses (i.e., accumulating Bancor reserves). 
  Keynes called for a charge on excessive overdrafts and on excessive reserve 
balances of one or two percentage points in order to encourage balanced trade. Other 
possible actions to be taken in the case of deficit countries include currency 
devaluation, capital controls, seizure of gold reserves, and domestic policy. Actions to 
be taken against surplus countries included expansion of domestic demand, 
appreciation of the currency, reduction of tariffs and other trade barriers, and 
encouragement of international development loans (Keynes 1980). Finally, the ICU 
could use its power to encourage economic development through the use of overdrafts 
for relief work, for development of buffer stocks of commodities, for the 
establishment of an International Investment Corporation, and to help stabilize prices 
(Keynes 1980).
1
  The Bancor Plan was never adopted. Rather, the U.S. proposal formed the 
basis for the Bretton Woods system. This was based on a fixed-but-adjustable system 
of exchange rates, with the dollar pegged to gold and serving as the international 
reserve currency. The system worked so long as the flow of dollars from the United 
States to the rest of the world was just sufficient to meet the world’s demand for 
dollar assets. By the late 1960s, the dollar was under pressure. Because the dollar was 
redeemable for gold, and because any hint of significant devaluation of the dollar 
would generate a run, the system was abandoned to protect the U.S. gold reserves. 
  Moving to a flexible exchange rate system was generally supported by 
neoclassical economists, most notably by Milton Friedman. The claim was that a 
flexible system would operate much like the fabled “specie-flow” mechanism, 
purported to have quickly rectified trade imbalances during the gold standard. The 
orthodox claim was that, in a flexible exchange rates regime, trade imbalances would 
                                                 
1 For more details on Keynes’s plan and his role in the reconstruction of the international monetary 
system, see Skidelsky (2000). 
 6cause currencies to adjust, automatically returning trade to equilibrium. After the 
three and a half decades of experience since the abandonment of Bretton Woods, this 
claim is thoroughly discredited. To be sure, nations have not adopted freely floating 
exchange rates, but interventions are not sufficiently large to explain the persistence 
of trade imbalances. In addition to long-term trade imbalances, the world has 
experienced a great deal of exchange rate instability (especially among developing 
nations) that is far larger than would be expected simply because of trade imbalances. 
Thus, the move to flexible exchange rates has not resulted in balanced trade and 
appears to have contributed to greater global instability. Nations like the United States 
run large, and rising, current account deficits for years and nations like Japan run 
large current account surpluses for decades without setting off equilibrium-seeking 
exchange rate adjustments. 
  To provide a solution to this situation, Davidson (1992), inspired by Keynes’s 
plan, has proposed the use of an international clearing money unit (ICMU) as an 
international reserve used only by central banks in an international clearing system. 
Each country would continue to use its own money of account for domestic purposes; 
private agents could choose any of these moneys of account for international 
purposes. Exchange rates among the international moneys of account would be fixed 
(with allowance made for adjustments under specified conditions). Clearing among 
central banks would then take place on the balance sheet of an international central 
bank, kept in ICMUs. As in Keynes’s scheme, sanctions would be placed on countries 
that continually faced clearing drains, and would also be placed on those countries 
that continually accumulated reserves of ICMUs. Under the Keynes-Davidson 
scheme, the creditor nations will lose their ICMU reserves if they don’t use them; 
they would then have an incentive to stimulate their economies so that the ICMU 
reserves would be used to support greater imports or greater foreign investment; 
alternatively, excess ICMUs could be given as grants.
2 
  In our view, an essential difficulty with Keynes’s, or the Keynes-inspired, 
approach to exchange rates and the international monetary system is that, as in the 
case of many mainstream analyses, they concentrate on trade imbalances and the 
current account while capital movements receive too little attention. As a 
                                                 
2 Basil Moore has advocated a “go-it-alone” fixed exchange rate system in which individual (smaller) 
nations would choose to peg against one of the more important currencies, but we believe that such a 
scheme would be inferior to the Davidson/Keynes multilateral system. 
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ICU, Keynes began by noting that his goal was to design an international currency 
system so that the currency exchange would be made to operate as if countries were 
“trading goods against goods” (Keynes 1980).
3 The operation of the ICU would be 
designed to ensure that Bancor reserves would not be lost to idle hoards; rather, the 
reserves of one country would form the basis of overdrafts of another, thereby 
encouraging trade. Davidson’s justification for his proposal is similar. 
  Keynes’s approach to the reform of the international monetary system recalls 
an older approach to money and its crucial role in the determination of crises in a 
capitalist economy. This approach was first followed by Marx. The essential rationale 
of a capitalist economy can be depicted by the money circuit 
',with ' M CM M M −− > : capitalists employ money capital (M) to buy means of 
production (C) in order to produce commodities that, once they are sold in the market, 
yield a monetary profit ( ' M M − ). The circuit can proceed undisturbed in so far as 
capitalists expect that their expenditure, M, actually yields a sufficiently large profit. 
If, instead, capitalists’ expectations are that production will not give rise to sufficient 
profits, they break the money circuit, i.e., they do not spend money to buy means of 
production but keep it idle, hoarded. As a consequence of hoarding, the economy 
experiences a crisis due to an insufficient level of aggregate demand. 
  All of this is replicated in the early drafts of the General Theory, in which 
Keynes insists that the purpose of production in a monetary economy is based on the 
expectation of profit. Unlike the barter or cooperative economy—which might use 
money, but in which money is neutral—in a monetary production economy, money 
can never be neutral. Just as Veblen’s Theory of Business Enterprise had rejected 
“political economy” that supposes that the purpose of production is consumption (and 
that the purpose of a sale is to obtain that which one wants to consume), Keynes also 
rejected the (neo)classical focus on consumption as the end of the production cycle. 
Marx’s criticism of classical political economy and Say’s Law was based on the idea 
that money is not simply a medium of exchange, necessarily used to buy commodities 
(or labor); money can also be demanded as a store of value, kept idle and, hence, can 
generate a crisis due to insufficient demand. Keynes himself, in those early drafts, 
                                                 
3 “The principal object can be explained in a single sentence: to provide that money earned by selling 
goods to one country can be spent on purchasing the products of any other country” (Keynes 1980). 
 8referred approvingly to Marx’s analysis (Sardoni 1997). Thus, both Marx and Keynes 
rejected the notion of money as a mere medium of exchange and point out that it is 
not always necessarily and immediately converted into goods or labor (so that there is 
never a problem of generalized excess supply). Money can be hoarded, making crisis 
possible. This is a crucial theoretical innovation, which provides the fundamental 
rationale of the principle of effective demand. 
  However, when considering the international monetary system, Marx’s and 
Keynes’s critique of money needs further developments. In the context of the 
international economy, in which there are many different currencies, another option is 
available to those who decide how to use money. Money, in the form of a specific 
currency, can be used to buy commodities, it can be kept idle, or it can be used to buy 
assets denominated in other currencies. The latter option is profitable when gains 
derive from purchases in a currency that is expected to appreciate against the 
domestic currency. In the modern context, much of the international reserves are 
hoarded by governments that want to protect their exchange rates. This still breaks 
Say’s Law and depresses global demand. It is this third option that, in Keynes’s 
proposal, as well as in other approaches to exchange rates, receives too little, if any, 
attention. While the Keynes/Davidson proposal would penalize nations that 
accumulate international reserves, it still appears to be biased toward the view that 
money (mostly) circulates goods. 
  In the real world, currencies are not used solely for current account 
transactions, but rather are also used in capital account transactions. Therefore, unless 
capital is completely immobile, there is no reason for exchange rate adjustments to 
eliminate current account imbalances (note that both the Keynes proposal and the 
Davidson proposal preserve the option of imposing austerity on nations with 
persistent trade deficits, recognizing that exchange rate adjustments might not work). 
Indeed, with the growth of global finance that easily evades national restrictions, the 
vast majority of international transactions—certainly more than 90% of total volume, 
and probably more than 99% of total volume—is not directly related to current 
accounts. If capital controls are neither politically nor technically feasible, then 
designing an exchange rate system based on the belief that the international monetary 
system should operate as if goods trade against goods is unlikely to function well. 
Further, it is hard to imagine countries and groups of countries with interests as 
diverse as those of the United States, China, and Euroland coming together to create 
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envisioned in the Davidson plan. 
  The Keynes/Davidson plan hopes to enhance external stability by fixing 
exchange rates and adopting several procedures to reduce trade imbalances. However, 
for reasons we discuss below, this comes at a great cost because the ability of a nation 
on a fixed exchange rate to use domestic policy to achieve internal stability is 
reduced. If the enhanced external stability does not itself also generate internal 
stability, there is a trade-off of external stability for internal instability.  
 
3. AN  ALTERNATIVE  (KEYNESIAN) APPROACH TO MONEY 
 
As we argued in the previous section, reformist projects for the international monetary 
system that concentrate on trade and current account imbalances are an inadequate 
response to the present situation, in which speculative capital movements play a 
central role in the international monetary system. However, in the present paper, we 
do not intend to propose an alternative reform of the international monetary system. 
We limit ourselves to outline an alternative approach to money, which is also derived 
from Keynes. This alternative approach is relevant in the present context as it implies 
the adoption of a regime of floating exchange rates by countries. 
  The alternative notion of money, based on its unit of account function, and 
close to Knapp’s approach, can be found in Keynes’s positions as expressed in A 
Treatise on Money. This line of argument has been called “state money,” or, in recent 
years, it has usually been called “chartalism.” The focus is on the sovereign nature of 
the unit of account. In the Treatise, Keynes argued that the “money of account comes 
into existence along with debts, which are contracts for deferred payment, and price 
lists, which are offers of contracts for sale or purchase.… [and] can only be expressed 
in terms of a money of account” (Keynes 1971). He distinguished between “money 
and money of account by saying that the money of account is the description or title 
and the money is the thing which answers to the description” (Keynes 1971). Further, 
the state “claims the right to determine what thing corresponds to the name, and to 
vary its declaration from time to time—when, that is to say, it claims the right to re-
edit the dictionary. This right is claimed by all modern States and has been so claimed 
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has been reached that Knapp’s chartalism—the doctrine that money is peculiarly a 
creation of the State–is fully realized” (Keynes 1971). Finally, “the age of chartalist or 
State money was reached when the State claimed the right to declare what thing 
should answer as money to the current money of account—when it claimed the right 
not only to enforce the dictionary but also to write the dictionary. Today all civilised 
money is, beyond possibility of dispute, chartalist” (Keynes 1971).
4
  Keynes explains that moneys are “derived categories” following from the 
creation of the unit of account. The two types of derivations are “offers of contracts, 
contracts and acknowledgments of debt, which are in terms of it, and money proper, 
answering to it, delivery of which will discharge the contract or the debt” (Keynes 
1971). Individuals discover “that for many purposes the acknowledgments of debt are 
themselves a serviceable substitute for money proper in the settlement of 
transactions” (Keynes 1971). In modern economies, bank money is the most 
important. Thus, we have, side by side, state money (money proper) and bank money 
(acknowledgments of debt). Moreover, the acknowledgments need not be of private 
debts; they can refer to debts of the state, which can “use its chartalist prerogative to 
declare that the [bank] debt itself is an acceptable discharge of a liability” (Keynes 
1971). This bank money becomes money proper, changing “its character” so that it 
“should no longer be reckoned as a debt, since it is of the essence of a debt to be 
enforceable in terms of something other than itself” (Keynes 1971). 
  When a bank makes a loan, it accepts an IOU and issues its own IOU; the 
bank’s debtor clears his IOU by delivering the bank’s IOU in payment. All modern 
banking systems include a clearing house so that a bank’s debtor can deliver the 
liability of any bank. Likewise, as Keynes noted, tax liabilities are mostly cleared by 
delivering bank liabilities, with the central bank clearing accounts for private banks 
and the treasury. There is a hierarchy of monies, with bank liabilities used by the 
                                                 
4 These views can be traced to Keynes’s earlier unpublished work on ancient monies, as well as to his 
1914 review of an article by A. Mitchell Innes, whose ideas where similar to Knapp’s (Wray 2004). 
Keynes approvingly noted Innes’s rejection of the story of the evolution of money from early 
commodity moneys to credit and fiat money. The value of coins was never determined by embodied 
metals; rather, they were “all token coins, their exchange value as money differing in varying degrees 
from their intrinsic value” (Keynes 1914). Like Knapp, Innes had argued that the way the state 
“enforces the dictionary” is by imposing a tax (or other involuntary) liability in the money of account. 
The state ensures that the money it issues—denominated in that unit of account—is generally accepted 
by agreeing to accept it in tax payments. So long as taxes are enforced, this is a sufficient condition to 
ensure that the state’s money will be accepted. 
 11nongovernment sector and with government liabilities used for net clearing among 
banks and with the government. Given this arrangement, banks must either hold some 
reserves for clearing (as in the United States), or must have ready access to them on 
demand (as in countries like Canada, where banks are allowed to strive for zero net 
reserve balances).
5
  According to Keynes, state money may take any of three forms: “Commodity 
Money, Fiat Money, and Managed Money, the last two being sub-species of 
Representative Money” (1971). Commodity money consists of “actual units of a 
particular freely-obtainable, nonmonopolised commodity which happens to have been 
chosen for the familiar purposes of money,” or “warehouse warrants for actually 
existing units of the commodity” (Keynes 1971). Fiat money is representative money 
“which is created and issued by the State, but is not convertible by law into anything 
other than itself, and has no fixed value in terms of an objective standard” (Keynes 
1971). This is distinguished from managed money, which “is similar to Fiat Money, 
except that the State undertakes to manage the conditions of its issue in such a way 
that, by convertibility or otherwise, it shall have a determinant value in terms of an 
objective standard” (Keynes 1971). Managed money is the most generalized form of 
money, which can “degenerate into Commodity Money on the one side when the 
managing authority holds against it a hundred per cent of the objective standard, so 
that it is in effect a warehouse warrant, and into Fiat Money on the other side when it 
loses its objective standard” (Keynes 1971). Both the gold standard and the Bretton 
Woods system of fixed but adjustable exchange rates were managed money systems. 
Most developed countries now have fiat money systems—the dollar system in the 
United States, the yen system in Japan, and so on. While the euro is a fiat money in 
the sense that it is not “convertible by law into anything other than itself,” the 
individual members of the EMU are users, not issuers, of the euro. Hence, the euro 
nations are operating toward the “commodity money” end of the managed money 
spectrum. Given these views on the nature of money, let us turn to the operation of 
modern sovereign nations. 
 
                                                 
5 Ultimately, a central bank cannot refuse to provide reserves for clearing if it wishes to maintain an 
orderly payments system with bank liabilities circulating at par. Further, to hit its interest rate target, 
the central bank must accommodate the demand for reserves. All of this is well established in the 
“horizontalist” approach accepted by most Post Keynesians. 
 124.  CURRENCY SOVEREIGNTY AND EXCHANGE RATE REGIMES 
 
A nation like the United States (as well as countries like Japan, Britain, the European 
nations before they adopted the Euro, and Argentina after it abandoned the currency 
board) creates a currency for domestic use and ensures its use primarily by demanding 
payment of taxes in that currency, although some also adopt legal tender laws. The 
state (including the Treasury and the Central Bank, which acts as an agent of 
government) issues and spends high powered money (HPM—cash and reserves at the 
central bank) without any promise to convert its HPM to any other currency, nor to 
gold or any other commodity, at any fixed exchange rate. The ability of a national 
state to behave in this way with respect to its currency and to maintain its fiscal 
independence is what we call sovereignty, although there are other aspects to 
sovereignty that we do not consider here. 
  The sovereign state spends (buys goods, services, or assets, or makes transfer 
payments) by issuing a Treasury check, or, increasingly, by simply crediting a private 
bank deposit. In either case, reserve balances (HPM) are created when the central 
bank credits the reserve account of the receiving bank.
6 Analogously, when the 
government receives tax payments, it reduces the reserve balance of a bank. 
Simultaneously, the taxpayer’s bank deposit is debited. While one commonly thinks 
of a government needing to first receive tax revenue, and then spending that revenue, 
this sequence is not necessary for any sovereign government. If a sovereign state 
spends by crediting a bank account (issuing its own IOU—HPM) and taxes by 
debiting a bank account (and eliminating its IOU—HPM), then, as a matter of logic, 
the government is not “spending” tax revenue. In other words, the sovereign 
government’s ability to make payments is neither revenue-constrained nor reserve-
constrained. 
  The final point is that the interest rate paid on sovereign securities is not 
subject to normal “market forces.” The sovereign government sells securities in order 
to drain excess reserves to hit its interest rate target. It could always choose to leave 
excess reserves in the banking system, in which case the overnight rate would fall 
                                                 
6 Complex coordination between the central bank and treasury are adopted that obscure the spending 
process. We will not go through these, but refer interested readers to the work done by Stephanie 
Kelton (Bell) (2000) and by Wray (1998, 2004). 
 13toward zero. When the overnight rate is zero, the Treasury can always offer to sell 
securities that pay a few basis points above zero and will find willing buyers because 
such securities offer a better return than the alternative (zero). There may be economic 
or political reasons for keeping the overnight rate above zero (in which case the 
interest rate paid on securities will also be above zero), but it is incorrect to argue that 
the size of a sovereign government deficit affects the interest rate paid on securities. 
This is a sometimes neglected conclusion that follows from the horizontalist claim 
that the overnight interest rate is exogenously set by the central bank. Since short-term 
government debt is essentially equivalent to interest-paying reserves, and thus a close 
substitute to lending in the overnight interbank market, the overnight rate set by the 
central bank will govern the short-term government “borrowing” rate.
7
  This indicates that a sovereign nation can choose interest rates on government 
debt as low as it wants. By the same token, the sovereign government could have 
interest rates above 100% if it so desired. All it need do is set the overnight rate target 
at 100% and then sell securities whenever excess reserves placed downward pressure 
on that rate. This drives home the point that the interest rate is exogenously set in any 
sovereign nation, as the horizontalists have long asserted. Whether the base rate will 
be zero or one hundred is a monetary policy matter, not subject to market 
determination. 
  A nonsovereign government is in an entirely different situation. In a 
“dollarized” nation, the government must obtain dollars before it can spend them. 
Hence, it uses taxes and issues IOUs to obtain dollars in anticipation of spending; 
unlike the case of a sovereign nation, this government must have deposits of dollars or 
euros before it can spend. Further, unlike the sovereign nation, the nonsovereign 
government promises to deliver third party IOUs to service its own debt (while the 
United States and other sovereign nations promise only to deliver their own IOUs). 
Because of this, the interest rate on the nonsovereign government’s dollar liabilities is 
not independently set (whether it is one of the fifty U.S. states or a dollarized nation). 
                                                 
7 The United States accomplished the same feat during WWII, when short-term Treasuries paid 3/8 of 
one percent, even as the deficit-to-GDP ratio reached 25% of GDP—three times higher than Japan’s 
current ratio! Rates on longer-term government debt are determined more complexly, but it is 
important to note that it is the government’s decision to issue longer-term government debt. It can 
always accomplish the objective of draining excess reserves by issuing short-term bonds and, thus, 
does not need to issue long-term bonds. Indeed, if it pays interest on reserve balances, it does not need 
to sell bonds at all. 
 14Since it is borrowing dollars, the rate a dollarized nation pays is determined by three 
factors. First, there is the base rate on dollars set by the monetary policy of the United 
States (the issuer of the dollar). Secondly, there is the market’s assessment of the 
nonsovereign government’s credit worthiness, which may be determined by a large 
number of factors. These two considerations determine the lowest interest rate the 
market will tolerate. Thirdly, the interest rate is also constrained by the nation’s need 
to keep its exchange rate fixed or pegged to another currency. Thus, a nonsovereign 
government, as user (not issuer) of a currency, cannot independently set the interest 
rate. 
  From this it evidently follows that the possibility for a state to set the interest 
rate in a world of high capital mobility is contingent on its adopting a regime of 
floating exchange rate. We believe that adopting a regime of floating exchange rates 
is important for developing countries in particular. They are rightly concerned with 
the financial and exchange rate crises suffered not long ago by Asian and Latin 
American nations, triggered by large external debts, declining foreign currency 
reserves, and market expectations that exchange rate pegs could not be held. In fact, 
these nations had adopted (formal or informal) pegs to the dollar that they ultimately 
were not able to hold. By contrast, a nation that adopts its own floating rate currency 
can always afford to put unemployed domestic resources to work. Its government will 
issue liabilities denominated in its own currency, and will service its debt in its own 
currency. Whether its debt is held internally or externally, it faces no insolvency risk. 
This does not mean that the nation will necessarily ignore its trade balance or 
movements of its exchange rate, but it does mean that it can put domestic employment 
and growth at the top of its policy agenda. 
  A sovereign nation is able to use domestic policy to achieve domestic or 
internal stability. As discussed above, this comes at the cost of possibly greater 
external instability. A floating exchange rate will not necessarily move trade toward 
balance, as discussed above. However, it must be remembered that from the macro 
perspective, imports are a benefit while exports are a cost. Hence, a trade deficit 
means net benefits. This is usually neglected in discussions of trade balances because 
of the presumed impacts on domestic employment. However, so long as the nation’s 
domestic policy is geared toward stability, it can achieve full employment, even in the 
presence of a trade deficit. This, in turn, requires sovereignty, which necessitates a 
floating exchange rate. It is possible that a trade deficit can exert downward pressure 
 15on the exchange rate, which can generate some “pass through” impacts on domestic 
inflation. If desired, domestic policy can turn to inflation-fighting, including the 
conventional method of using unemployment to attenuate inflation pressures. While 
we would not advocate such a method, we merely point out that the sovereign nation 
can implement policy geared toward achieving internal stability. 
  A nation that adopts a fixed exchange rate must hope that the conditions that 
generate external stability will also happen to coincide with those that permit internal 
stability. The nation that floats can enjoy the net benefits of a trade deficit, improved 
real terms of trade (a trade deficit means that the “real” cost in terms of exports is 
lower), and domestic full employment somewhat offset by the possible costs of 
currency depreciation and higher prices. The nation that fixes the exchange rate may 
not be able to “afford” a trade deficit (because of exchange rate pressures) and will 
probably have to use domestic unemployment as the means to maintain its peg. For 
these reasons, a flexible exchange rate preserves “policy space” for independent 
policy formation. 
  In the next section, we look at the Argentinean case as a concrete illustration 
of the negative implications of renouncing sovereignty and the advantages of 
regaining it by adopting floating exchange rates. We also briefly look at the European 
experience with monetary integration as an example of countries that have given up 
their monetary independence. 
 
5.  THE ARGENTINEAN AND THE EUROPEAN CASES 
 
Argentina gave up its currency sovereignty when it adopted a currency board based 
on the dollar and then regained sovereignty by abandoning the currency board during 
its resulting economic crisis. When Argentina abandoned the currency board, it 
gained policy independence: its exchange rate was no longer tied to the dollar’s 
performance, its fiscal policy was no longer held hostage to the quantity of dollars the 
government could accumulate, and its domestic interest rate came under control of its 
central bank. 
  One of the first policy initiatives taken by newly elected President Kirchner 
was a job creation program that guaranteed employment for poor heads of 
households. Within four months, the Plan Jefes y Jefas de Hogar had created jobs for 
 162 million participants—equal to 13% of the labor force. This not only helped to quell 
social unrest by providing income to Argentina’s poorest families, but it also put the 
economy on the road to recovery. Conservative estimates of the multiplier effect of 
the increased spending by Jefes workers are that it added a boost of more than 2.5% 
of GDP. In addition, the program provided needed services and new public 
infrastructure that encouraged additional private sector spending. Without the 
flexibility provided by a sovereign, floating currency, the government would not have 
been able to promise such a job guarantee. 
  Argentina also benefited from currency flexibility that was made possible by 
dropping the peg to the dollar, as her exports became competitively priced. The U.S. 
expansion, as well as the world-wide rise of commodities prices, has helped 
Argentinean exports. However, there is some precariousness inherent to reliance on 
export-led growth and Argentina must continue to develop its domestic markets so 
that it will not be so reliant on U.S. growth. Currency sovereignty allows the nation to 
use fiscal policy (and monetary policy) to continue to create jobs in the private and 
public sectors as an alternative to export-led growth. 
  Although different from Argentina and other cases of explicit or implicit 
dollarization, the European experience leading to the creation of a common currency 
area is another important example of the serious effects for national states of giving 
up their sovereignty through renouncing flexible exchange rates. European countries 
adopted a common currency area and created a single central bank in their quest for 
stable exchange rates within Europe. There is nothing inherently wrong with 
monetary integration that leads to a fixed exchange rate within a union; indeed, the 
United States can be thought of as a currency union with fixed exchange rates among 
the fifty states. What is highly questionable is the way in which monetary integration 
was pursued, as it has been realized with scarce, if any, concern for fiscal integration, 
so that individual European nations have lost their currency sovereignty while no 
federal sovereign fiscal institution has been created.
8
  The European strategy of monetary integration is somewhat paradoxical. The 
European process of integration has always been characterized by the crucial role 
played by political factors. The creation of a currency area made up of significantly 
                                                 
8 For a more detailed criticism of the European monetary integration along the same line, see Sardoni 
(2006, forthcoming). 
 17heterogeneous countries was an essentially political decision and not the spontaneous 
outcome of their convergence. There is the idea that monetary integration itself would 
promote the degree of economic convergence among countries required for an 
efficient currency area. In this way, Europe could become one of Mundell’s optimal 
currency areas. 
  However, while recognizing the importance of the political dimension, Europe 
has at the same time largely overlooked important implications of acknowledging the 
importance of the role of the state and politics in the process of integration. First of 
all, Europe has overlooked the role that fiscal policy at the federal level can play in 
the process toward the creation ex post of an efficient currency area. In a situation in 
which the countries that adopt a common currency are heterogeneous and 
characterized by low flexibility of prices and wages, as well as low mobility of the 
factors of production, the risk of asymmetric shocks can be dealt with by the creation 
of a fiscal counterpart to the single central bank. A federal fiscal authority can 
compensate for the effects of asymmetric shocks through its policy, but there is more 
than the role of fiscal policy to mitigate the effects of asymmetric shocks. Besides the 
implementation of fiscal policy, a federal government can impose laws and encourage 
behavior that gives rise to more flexible markets and, hence, bring the monetary union 
closer to an optimum currency area (Goodhart 1998). 
  The process of monetary integration in Europe draws its inspiration from a 
theoretical stance that sees fiscal policy as distorting and ineffective in the long run. 
More generally, state interventions are seen as something to avoid to the maximum 
possible extent, in order not to disturb the spontaneous working of the economy. As a 
result, we believe, Europe has adopted a quite unique process. The strong link 
between the state (which has fiscal authority) and the creation and administration of 
money has been weakened to the point of having a central bank that is totally 
independent of national states, with no fiscal counterpart to it. 
  In general, the concept of an independent central bank is basically flawed and 
ambiguous,
9 but in the concrete European experience the concept has come true. The 
ECB is totally independent, both with respect to the fixing of its objectives and with 
respect to the policies adopted to realize them. In this framework, individual national 
states are constrained, as they cannot freely use fiscal instruments to affect output and 
                                                 
9 For a critique of the central banks’ independence, see Forder (1998) and Bibow (2004). 
 18employment. Europe seems to be entrapped in a vicious circle. The ECB’s anti-
inflationary stance and the European governments’ requirement to be “fiscally 
responsible” produces substantial stagnation. “Cautious,” or restrictive, monetary 
policies discourage the growth of investment and aggregate demand in general. The 
endogenous nature of budget deficits means that slow growth impedes tax generation, 
causing deficits to worsen. This forces a growing effort to stay in line with the fiscal 
parameters and, hence, a further negative impact on demand. In this context, the 
European Union relies on foreign demand as an engine of economic growth. But this 
gives rise to a circularity: each member state tries to increase net exports—both with 
other EU nations and with the rest of the world—in part by trying to become a low-
cost producer. As exchange rates are fixed with the rest of the EU, the only alternative 
is to maintain or reduce wages and prices within the member state. This adds more 
pressure for fiscal austerity and slow growth. The euro experience seems to provide a 
negative lesson for those advocating “go it alone” approaches to pegged exchange 




The world has changed tremendously since the 1940s when the Bretton Woods 
system was formed. That system performed quite well, with fixed but adjustable 
exchange rates. However, it was developed for a world in which capital flows were 
controlled and nearly nonexistent, dominated by official flows. This, after all, can 
explain why Keynes’s plan largely ignored the role and effects of capital movements 
on exchange rates. Further, even trade in goods and services was quite restrained, in 
part due to the overwhelming dominance by the United States. 
  Over time, the United States lost its unique role as Europe recovered and Asia 
became a major producer. Likewise, private capital flows grew gradually, and then in 
a torrent—partially due to technological change and partially due to “liberal” policy 
that sought to free financial markets. Even before much progress was made in that 
direction, the Bretton Woods system collapsed. While some still nostalgically call for 
a return to a fixed exchange rate system modeled on Keynes’s Bancor Plan, current 
economic and political trends make this highly improbable. Nor can most nations 
individually adopt fixed rates because speculative attacks can break virtually all 
 19pegs—except for a few modern mercantilist nations that have accumulated 
unassailable hoards of dollars. 
  Pegged exchange rates remove an important degree of freedom, holding 
domestic fiscal and monetary policy hostage to the exchange rate. Euroland nations 
adopted Maastricht criteria to constrain policy making as an important condition to 
integration and adoption of the single currency. Although the criteria are, after all, 
quite generous, allowing substantial fiscal deficits, they are regularly exceeded, even 
by nations that have slow growth and high unemployment—that is, by nations that are 
living far below their means. It is difficult to project how this experiment will play 
out. Other nations, such as Argentina, have collapsed under the weight of currency 
board arrangements—and recovered only after returning to a sovereign, floating rate 
currency.  
  A floating rate allows for greater domestic policy independence—providing 
fiscal and monetary policy space. However, it must be stressed that adopting a 
floating exchange rate is no panacea. A regime of flexible exchange rates cannot, of 
course, guarantee that effective domestic policies are chosen and implemented. It is 
only a necessary condition for gaining policy independence. It does not by itself 
ensure either enlightened use of this policy independence or an easy path to growth 
and development. In the current world situation, floating exchange rates are a 
necessary, but not sufficient, condition for the implementation of policies able to 
promote more growth, employment, and welfare.
10 Ultimately, the adoption of such 
policies is contingent on the ability and willingness of social, political, and economic 
actors to do so. 
  Note that a flexible or floating rate regime is not necessarily a “free float” 
system. We would leave some room for discretionary intervention. What we advocate 
is a “managed money” system, but one that is closer to Keynes’s “fiat money” system 
than to the “commodity money” system at the other extreme. Fiscal and monetary 
policy, as well as official transactions in exchange markets, can still be used to 
“manage” exchange rates in some circumstances. In particular, interventions are 
envisioned in the case of rapid revaluations to ease competitive pressures arising from 
                                                 
10 Calvo and Mishkin (2003), referring to developing economies, hold that the adoption of sound 
policies and institutions is much more important than the exchange rate regime: “we believe that the 
choice of exchange rate regime is likely to be of second order importance to the development of good 
fiscal, financial, and monetary institutions in producing macroeconomic success.” What is “good” for 
Calvo and Mishkin, however, is not necessarily what we intend by using this term. 
 20an overvalued currency. However, achieving domestic, internal stability would be the 
primary goal of policy, with full employment the most important domestic policy 
objective. 
  Floating exchange rates give nations one more degree of freedom but, of 
course, they also imply some costs. Among such costs there can be a larger degree of 
uncertainty due to the possible high volatility of exchange rates and terms of trade, as 
well as the costs of the possible triggering of inflationary processes deriving from a 
large depreciation of the national currency, which makes the price of imports increase. 
From this point of view, greater stability and independence could perhaps be achieved 
by some combination of floating exchange rates, combined with capital controls and 
trade policy—especially in the case of developing nations. These factors would make 
it easier to adopt managed exchange rates. However, the question concerning how to 
introduce effective capital controls in the present world situation remains open. 
  Keynes’s plan relied on the existence of some form of international 
governance. If it became possible to construct international institutions to promote 
economic growth by focusing attention on financing development, this could also 
improve international economic performance by making it possible to give exchange 
rates and terms of trade more stability. In this perspective, the European experience is 
a telling example. Monetary integration can be, in principle, the correct response to 
the need for more stable external conditions in the European countries, but the present 
European arrangements, although they give stability to exchange rates, do not seem to 
work effectively to guarantee more growth and higher levels of employment. The 
basic reason is that there is no supranational institution that plays the role played by 
the governments of sovereign nations. In other words, the EMU does not seem to 
work satisfactorily for the same reasons that a world regime of fixed exchange rates 
cannot function well without a supranational institution with tasks analogous to those 
envisaged by Keynes and others. 
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